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Abstract—We present a private information retrieval (PIR)
scheme that allows a user to retrieve a single message from an
arbitrary number of databases by colluding with other users
while hiding the desired message index. This scheme is of
particular significance when there is only one accessible database-
a special case that turns out to be more challenging for PIR in
the multi-database case. The upper bound for privacy-preserving
capacity for these scenarios is C = (1 + 1S + · · · + 1SK−1 )−1, where
K is the number of messages and S represents the quantity of
information sources such as S = N + U − 1 for U users and
N databases. We show that the proposed information retrieval
scheme attains the capacity bound even when only one database is
present, which differs from most existing works that hinge on the
access to multiple databases in order to hide user privacy. Unlike
the multi-database case, this scheme capitalizes on the inability
for a database to cross-reference queries made by multiple users
due to computational complexity.
Index Terms—Private information retrieval, capacity, multiple
users
I. INTRODUCTION
The area of Private Information Retrieval (PIR) focuses on
obtaining information from various databases while protecting
user privacy. The goal of PIR is to maintain privacy while
retrieving the largest amount of information possible while
downloading the minimum quantity of irrelevant information
necessary in order to obfuscate the desired message index.
In the classical PIR setting [1], there are multiple non-
communicating and replicated databases that contain the same
messages from which a user may download a particular
message of interest. When multiple identical databases are
present, a user can download different segments of the desired
message from different databases and then patch them into
a complete message, thus hiding its intent for all databases.
For this purpose, the user prepares a query for each database,
such that the queries do not reveal the user’s intent. From the
perspective of information theory, the goal of query design
is to maximize retrieval efficiency. Our motivation behind
studying this problem in PIR stems from the problem of
privacy-preserving information retrieval with a single database.
We use capacity to determine how efficient we can create a
PIR scheme in terms of the ratio of desired information bits
to the total quantity of information amassed by a single user.
This work was partly supported by the US NSF grant # SaTC-1704274.
There has been considerable progress on topics that involve
databases trying various strategies to compromise privacy,
such as databases sharing information with other databases
to compromise the privacy of a user, known as colluding
databases [2]. When up to T of the N databases are colluding,
the setting is known as "T-private PIR" (TPIR). If all databases
are colluding, then capacity for a single user is equivalent to
the setting when accessing a single database, which is a major
issue encountered in PIR. What has not been considered by [3]
is the presence of multiple users working together to obfuscate
the message index while accessing information. This is known
as "single-server multi-user PIR" (SSMUPIR), for which there
is little prior work [4]. This solution can be expanded to
solve other problems, such as systems with multiple databases.
While [4] has successfully proven the feasibility for a multi-
user setting, the maximum retrieval rate has yet to be found.
There has been prior work for single-server PIR in [5] and
becomes feasible when communication complexity satisfies
a particular threshold. However, there has not yet been any
systematic research on how a retrieval scheme can be designed
for an individual user to interact with multiple users and an
arbitrary number of databases while maintaining privacy.
This paper aims to solve the capacity of both the single
database problem and the multi-database problems. Our solu-
tion considers the unifying setting with an arbitrary number
of databases because many real-world applications create
collusion across networked databases. When instantiated to
the little-studied single database setting, our novel approach
derives from the observation that a setting with one database
and multiple users can be mapped as a mirrored version of
[6]. This approach allows us to design a retrieval scheme and
analyze maximum retrieval efficiency. We refer to the setting
of multiple users accessing multiple databases as multi-user
PIR (MUPIR). Our setting for introducing MUPIR stems from
the basis for network coding in [7] to improve throughput
via creating multiple channels. In our setting, we create more
channels by increasing the number of users that can interact
with a fixed set of databases. We focus on the problem
created by databases examining queries made by a single
user and determine that potential information sources, users
and databases, should be treated as separate random variables.
Along this line, [8] demonstrates how three random variables
could be used for characterizing capacity, which could be
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useful for creating an extension of the work presented by [6].
A query must be made in order to move information from a
database to a user, which contains a linear combination of bits
from multiple sources of information.
The ensuing paper is organized as follows. Section II defines
the problem of interest. Section III presents the capacity of
MUPIR, followed by a scheme that achieves this capacity.
Section IV formally proves the capacity of MUPIR, and
Section V demonstrates that the proposed scheme for MUPIR
reaches the derived capacity. Concluding remarks are included
in Section VI.
Notation: To represent the set of answers
{
A[θ]1 , · · · , A[θ]U
}
,
θ being the desired message index and U as the number of
users, we use A[θ]1:U . For
{
A[1]1:U, · · · , A[K]1:U
}
, the notation A[1:K]1:U
is applied. To represent Q[θ]1:S , we employ the compact form∑
Q. For any positive integer A, we denote an index set using
[A] = {1, 2, · · · , A}. We utilize the notation Q ∼ A to indicate
Q and A are identically distributed. Let [U] \u = [U ′], so that
u < [U ′].
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a network of U users who seek to access messages
contained in N databases. It is assumed that all of the N
databases contain the same K messages Wk , ∀k ∈ [K]. Each
message Wθ is made of L bits, which can be downloaded bit
by bit and then patched together to reconstruct the original
message. A user seeks to retrieve message Wθ by having a
user generate a total of S queries for message θ, denoted as
Q[θ]s , sent to all S = N +U − 1 sources. Each source answers
the original user with A[θ]s , ∀s ∈ [S], and allows for the desired
message Wθ to be obtainable from a set of D bits. The scheme
utilized to retrieve information, Q(s, θ), generates Q[θ]s . When
query Q[θ]s is sent to user u, then the query is forwarded to a
single, arbitrary database n. Answer A[θ]s is returned to user u,
who returns the answer to the original user. If query Q[θ]s is
sent to database n, then A[θ]s is directly returned to the original
user.
Our objective is to retrieve a message Wθ from a database
and other users without revealing the value of the message
index, θ, while obtaining the message at the maximum possible
rate. We define rate as a ratio R = L/D, where L is the
length of the intended message Wθ , and D is total number of
downloaded bits. In order for a single user to hide the message
index from U −1 users and N databases, all queries generated
by Q(s, θ) must be identical in structure for the same sets
of K distinct messages. This leaves us to readapt the privacy
constraint defined by [5, eq. (8)] as
(Q[1]s , A[1]s ,W1:K ) ∼ (Q[k]s , A[k]s ,W1:K ), ∀s ∈ [S], k ∈ [K]. (1)
Additionally, to maintain privacy, each query Q[θ]s , ∀s ∈ [S]
must be independent of the desired message index, θ. We ex-
press this by evaluating the mutual information, I(Û;Û), between
Q[k]1:S and W1:K , ensuring there is no definite overlap between
the queries and messages. We formally express this as defined
in [2, eq. (3)]:
I(Q[k]1:S;W1:K ) = 0, ∀k ∈ [K]. (2)
To represent the size of message Wθ in terms of bits, we use
the binary entropy function H(Wθ ). We express the size of Wθ
related to the size of other messages by using index k in the
form
H(Wθ ) = H(Wk) = L, ∀k ∈ [K]. (3)
The purpose of finding capacity in PIR is to find the maximum
rate of retrieval, which focuses on obtain the largest possible
message by downloading the smallest amount of bits while
satisfying the criterion for privacy. The total size (in bits) of
all K messages can be equivalently represented as
K∑
k=1
H(Wk) = KH(Wθ ) = H(W1:K ). (4)
The total quantity of downloaded information by a central user
from S sources is defined as D = SH(A[k]1 ). Alternatively, for
desired message Wθ , D = SH(A[θ]1 ) is downloaded. We are
not concerned with the upload cost for sending queries, so we
do not directly take into account the magnitude of H(Q[θ]s ).
In order to decode the quantity information withheld in an
answer, a user must have knowledge of all queries. Thus, we
must evaluate the entropy of downloaded information in the
form H(A[θ]s |
∑
Q). We adapt the definition of rate in [3]:
R ,
L
D
=
H(Wθ )
SH(A[θ]1 |
∑
Q)
(5)
We use the general notation CMUPIR to represent capacity in a
multi-user and a multi-database setting. The relation between
rate and capacity can be expressed as R ≤ CMUPIR, since it is
not possible to achieve a more efficient rate than the capacity.
In order to design an efficient retrieval scheme, [6] states the
following three principles, the first two of which are imposed
to ensure user privacy, while the third principle is used to
improve efficiency for retrieving information.1
(1) Queries to each information source obtain forced sym-
metry
(2) Message symmetry is enforced within all answers and
queries
(3) Side information of undesired messages is exploited to
retrieve new desired information
Based upon these principles, we next analyze capacity and
design retrieval algorithms for databases to address capacity-
achieving solutions for classical PIR in order to evaluate the
computational cost of thwarting our scheme. Our designs
are developed for two scenarios: One is when the databases
honestly respond to queries but do not analyze the queries, and
the other is when databases can analyze and cross-reference
queries from multiple users to determine the user’s desired
message index. In order to determine our scheme’s usefulness,
1Each enumerated item corresponds to arrows indicating different steps of
generating queries.
we must determine the computational cost associated with
analyzing the query schemes. Evaluating Algorithms 1 and 2
of Appendices A and B, it is feasible to compute the desired
message index with a computational complexity of O(n2). Due
to the similarities between Algorithms 1 and 2, n would have
to correspond to the length of each query sent to a database.
If a database does have the option to cross-reference queries,
then the remaining set of U − 1 would be forced to replicate
all contents stored in a database to guarantee privacy. Given
the scope of our problem, we do not take into consideration
the efficiency of replicating all K messages across all U − 1
users.
III. MAIN RESULTS
A. PIR Capacity for Independent Databases
We start with the first case assuming that users cannot
collude and the databases are non-communicating. Under such
assumptions, there has not been a great deal of research
performed with multi-user PIR settings, specifically addressing
multi-user and multi-database settings. We find that users can
collude together against an arbitrary number of databases
while satisfying the defined privacy constraints. Our main
result on the user privacy-preserving capacity is given by
Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Our capacity for MUPIR applies to settings
with N non-curious or computationally-limited databases and
U trustworthy users. We characterize S = N + U − 1 sources
of information to have the capacity:
CMUPIR =
(
1 +
1
S
+ · · · + 1
SK−1
)−1
(6)
Our theorem is similar in design to the theorem for classical
PIR proposed in [6], however, our novel approach focuses on
adding on additional users treated like databases in order to
increase retrieval rate.
B. Proposed Retrieval Scheme
A functional system with multiple users and a single
database can be generated by mirroring the classical PIR prob-
lem in [6] and adopting the necessary privacy constraints. Our
solution focuses on the SSMUPIR setting and its extension, the
MUPIR setting. The fundamental process behind our scheme
is as follows:
1) Generate a query scheme with other users to access
information from an arbitrary number of databases
2) Send queries to the database(s) and other users
3) Receive and combine answers from the database(s) and
other users
A visual model of the mirrored scheme we create is shown in
Fig. 1. The upper bound for capacity in a setting with a single
user is achieved by a scheme utilized in [6]. Calling function
Q(s, θ) results in "k-sums," generated by the equation ∑Kk=1(S−
1)k−1 (Kk ) . There are also two other options for the U − 1 users
that are considered: In some contexts, all U − 1 users must
replicate all contents stored within a select database in order
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Fig. 1. A visual depiction of a user attempting PIR with two other users and
a database.
for a central user to preserve privacy from other users. This is
necessary when a database cross-references queries made by
multiple users and wants to see if there are any colluding users
and reveal a potential desired message index. If a database is
computationally bounded and cannot analyze queries made by
all users, then there is no need for U − 1 users to replicate the
entirety of the database with their own means of storage. Our
scheme would have to be limited in application to settings with
databases that cannot afford to cross-reference queries from all
users. We create another example in Fig. 2 while assuming the
three defined principles are followed. Consider a simple PIR
setting with a single database (N = 1) and two users (U = 2).
Our scheme begins by having an arbitrary user (U1) request a
portion of a desired message bit of W1 from the database DB1,
which in this case is a1. The first principle (1) is applied to
result in the other user (U2) to request bit a2. Applying the next
principle (2) results in bits b1 and b2 being requested by each
respective source. Principle (3) is responsible for bits b1 and
b2 being utilized as side information and compressed in each
users’ queries to allow for efficiency. By randomly requesting
each bit from a message to create an equal probability of all
message indices being desired, privacy is preserved.
U1 U2
a1
(1)−−→ U1 U2
a1 a2
(2)−−→ U1 U2
a1, b1 a2, b2
· · ·
· · · (3)−−→
U1 U2
a1, b1 a2, b2
a3 + b2
(1)−−→
U1 U2
a1, b1 a2, b2
a3 + b2 a4 + b1
Fig. 2. Demonstration of Query Generation for K = 2, N = 1, and U = 2.
In this setting, a message of size L = 4 bits is recovered from a
set of D = 6 downloaded bits. Thus, a rate of R = LD =
4
6 =
2
3
is achieved and satisfies the capacity in Theorem 1. To prove
that rate increases, we move forward by formally proving the
relationship with N databases and U users with capacity.
IV. PROVING CAPACITY
For the original setting of SSMUPIR, our solution stems
from setting N = 1 and S = U in eqn. 6, yielding the capacity
for SSMUPIR. We formally prove the capacities of SSMUPIR
and MUPIR by finding the quantity of desired information,
H(Wθ ) and the cardinality of Q(s, θ). We apply this to the
definition of rate in (5) in order to find capacity.
Lemma 1: ∀S ∈ N>0 and θ ∈ [K], message Wθ can be suc-
cessfully retrieved while maintaining privacy from all sources
and achieve R ≤ (1 + 1S + · · · + 1SK−1 )−1.
Proof: For simplicity, let θ = 1 and K = 1, to obtain
message W1. Building off the previous Lemma, we char-
acterize the capacity of MUPIR with respect to preserving
privacy from other users, utilizing the function I(A[1]1:U ;W1).
Similar to the the setting for SSMUPIR, the identity for
H(A[1]n |
∑
Q) , H(A[1]u |
∑
Q) applies to settings where both
U and N are greater than 1, which is characterized by
I(A[1]1:U ; A[1]1:N ;W1) for solving capacity.2 We evaluate the upper
bound of mutual information to be:
I(A[1]1:U ; A[1]1:N ;W1 |
∑
Q) ≤ I(A[1]1:U ; A[1]1:N |
∑
Q) (7)
Evaluating the boundary of mutual information is critical
for solving capacity. For the case of a single user and a
single database, the quantity of downloaded information is
determined by I(A[1]1 ; A[1]1 ;W1 |Q) = I(A[1]1 , A[1]2:U ;W1 |
∑
Q) ≤
H(A[1]1 |
∑
Q), since there is only one source of new infor-
mation, rather than two sources due to a single user be-
ing unable to generate new information independently. This
distinction causes us to substitute I(A[1]1:U ; A[1]1:N |
∑
Q) with
I(A[1]2:U ; A[1]1:N |
∑
Q). In order to find our desired result, we
must minimize conditional entropy so that H(A[1]2:U |A[1]1:N ) =
H(A[1]1:N |A[1]2:U ) = 0 to achieve
I(A[1]2:U ; A[1]1:N |
∑
Q) = H(A[1]2:U, A[1]1:N |
∑
Q) (8)
We combine answers A[1]2:U and A
[1]
1:N to create A
[1]
1:S to represent
new information from an equivalent quantity of S sources. We
conveniently characterize the new capacity starting from
H(W1) = H(W1 |∑Q) ≤ I(A[1]1:S;W1 |∑Q) (9)
From here, we can apply the same techniques for entropy con-
ditioning used in [9] by evaluating I(A[1]1 , A[1:K]2:S ;W1:K |
∑
Q)
with the assumption that K = 3. By induction, we obtain our
capacity for the MUPIR with preservation of privacy from all
S = N +U − 1 sources:
R ≤
(
1 +
1
S
+ · · · + 1
SK−1
)−1
(10)
This concludes our proof for capacity of all PIR settings with
multiple users or databases.
V. ACHIEVABILITY OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Lemma 2: ∀θ ∈ [K], and s ∈ [S], the structure of Q(u, θ)
achieves the cardinality |Q(s, θ)| = SK−1 + 1S−1 (SK−1) in a
single database setting. The deterministic function can be
extended to utilize settings where N > 1 by generating
(N +U − 2)k−1 instances for each k-sum.
Proof: The query scheme used to address this problem
is nearly identical to the k-sum equation presented in [6]. A
2A brief overview of how we utilize multivariate mutual information is
included in Appendix C.
necessary modification is that (U − 1)k−1 instances for each
k-sum must increase for each database present to generate
(N +U − 2)k−1 instances.
|Q(u, θ)| = |Q(s, θ)| =
K∑
k=1
(
K
k
)
(S − 1)k−1 (11)
= SK−1 + 1S−1 (SK−1 − 1) (12)
We now know the relationship between downloaded informa-
tion and replicated databases and can determine rate.
With the length of the desired message and cardinality
of downloaded information known, we can determine the
information-theoretic rate.
Lemma 3: The rate achieved is equal to the capacity, CMUPIR =
(1 + 1S + · · · + 1SK−1 )−1.
Proof: Assuming the cardinality of Q(s, θ) presented in
Lemma 5 is correct, the result can applied to the definition of
rate to find that the scheme is capacity-achieving.
R ,
L
D
=
SK
S |Q(s, θ)| =
SK−1∑K
k=1
(K
k
)(S − 1)k−1 (13)
=
(
1 +
1
S (1 − 1SK−1 )
1 − 1S
)−1
=
(
1 +
1
S
+ · · · + 1
SK−1
)−1
(14)
The rate achieved by (14) is equal to the capacity presented
in Theorem 1.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our adaptation of the original scheme presented in [6]
shows that there is a great deal of potential for undermining
systems of colluding databases by introducing other users as
potential sources of information. We are not surprised that the
capacity of the three possible scenarios in focus is identical.
Intuitively, we would expect there to be a lower capacity in
other scenarios where there are malicious users or databases
having knowledge of user collusion. We have successfully
contributed to the field of PIR by 1) finding the upper bound of
capacity for settings with multiple users in a single database
setting, 2) characterized the capacity for a user for settings
with a user interacting with other users alongside multiple
databases, and 3) creating a PIR scheme that can be utilized in
all of these settings. However, this scheme is only guaranteed
to protect privacy if the database analyzes queries made by
a single user at a time due to computational costs. If the
database in question cross-references all queries made by all
users, then privacy is at risk of being compromised. By solving
this issue, a breakthrough can be made in PIR for securing
privacy against many networked databases.
APPENDIX A
ALGORITHM FOR BRUTE FORCE ANALYSIS OF A QUERY
MADE BY AN INDIVIDUAL USER TO FIND THE DESIRED
MESSAGE INDEX
Algorithm 1 Input: Query Set Q(User, θ). Output: θ.
Require: All queries from a distinct user to a database are
complete.
1: Initialize: Associative array µ containing all bits for K
messages as keys with their respective indices mapped as
values ∀k ∈ [K]. Initialize array β of length K containing
all zeroes.
2: for all α ∈ Q(User, θ) do {For each bit...}
3: if α < µ then {...if a bit is unidentifiable...}
4: for all α′ ∈ Q(User, θ) do {...then compare to all
other bits...}
5: if (α ⊕ α′) ∈ µ then {...if an identifiable bit is
generated...}
6: β[µ[α ⊕ α′]] += 1 {...increment the respective
index in the list for storing the numbers of identified bits.}
7: end if
8: end for
9: else {If the bit is already distinguishable...}
10: β[µ[α]] += 1 {...increment the respective index...}
11: end if
12: end for
13: return max(β) {...and end by returning θ.}
APPENDIX B
ALGORITHM FOR BRUTE FORCE ANALYSIS OF QUERIES
MADE BY MULTIPLE USERS TO FIND THE DESIRED
MESSAGE INDEX
Algorithm 2 Input: Query Sets
∑
Q. Output: θ.
Require: All queries from a distinct set of users to a database
are complete.
1: Initialize: Associative array µ containing all bits for K
messages as keys with their respective indices mapped as
values ∀k ∈ [K]. Initialize array β of length K containing
all zeroes.
2: for all u ∈ [U] do {For each user...}
3: for all α ∈ Q(u, θ) do {...analyze each bit...}
4: for all u′ ∈ [U ′] do {...by comparing to other
users...}
5: if α < µ then {...if a bit is unidentifiable...}
6: for all α′ ∈ Q(u′, θ) do {...compared to all other
bits...}
7: if (α ⊕ α′) ∈ µ then {...if an identifiable bit
is generated...}
8: β[µ[α ⊕ α′]] += 1 {...update the respective
index count in the list for storing the numbers of identified
bits.}
9: end if
10: end for
11: else {If the bit is already distinguishable...}
12: β[µ[α]] += 1 {...increment the respective in-
dex...}
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
16: end for
17: return max(β) {...and return θ.}
APPENDIX C
CHARACTERIZATION OF MULTIVARIATE MUTUAL
INFORMATION
To characterize I(A[1]1:U ; A[1]1:N ;W1), we apply the following:
From Theorem 2 of [8], the upper bound for mutual informa-
tion utilizing three random variables (X , Y , and Z) is
I(X;Y ; Z) ≤ min{I(X;Y ), I(X; Z), I(Y ; Z)}
This identity stems from using mutual information in the form
I(X;Y ). The upper bound of interaction information can be
expressed as
H(W1) ≤ min{I(A[1]1:U ; A[1]1:N ), I(A[1]1:U ;W1), I(A[1]1:N ;W1)}
By definition, I(A[1]1:U ;W1) and I(A[1]1:N ;W1) must be maximized
in order to achieve capacity, thus obtaining:
H(W1) ≤ I(A[1]1:U ; A[1]1:N )
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